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Summary  findings
To take full advantage of foreign investors, a host  financial management and prudential regulation. A case
country must provide an appealing environment: a stable  could be made for additional policy measures aimed at
economic and political environment;  a fair, rational, and  curbing overreliance on short-term debt. (Chile,
comprehensive legal svstem; a fair, reasonable, and  Colombia, and Israel, for example, have adopted
balanced tax program:; a fair, productive, and balanced  measures to influence the level and composition of
regulatory system; ancd  transparency in economic,  portfolio capital inflows.)
financial, legislative, and regulatory systems.  Arguably, liberalization of trade in financial services is
The country should also liberalize capital account  integral to full liberalization of capital markets. Foreign
transactions. To do so successfully  and minimize risks  firms operating in a domestic market may transfer useful
associated with foreign investors, capital account  technology and know-how.
liberalization must be properly sequenced.  Concern that hedge funds can dominate  or manipulate
The chief danger is removing most restrictions on  markets can be dealt with through measures to
capital account transactions before addressing major  strengthen supervision, regulation, and market
problems in the domestic financial system and hence  transparency-as  well as by strengthening reporting
risking a crisis. Typical major problems include shaky,  requirements for larger traders and positions. The ability
inconsistent macroeconomic management; severe  of hedge funds and other foreign investors to take
asymmetric information problems (such as inadequate  positions in domestic financial markets could also be
accounting, auditing, and disclosure practices) in the  limited by:
financial and corporate sectors; implicit government  * Taxing short-term capital flows (as Chile does).
guarantees; and inadequate prudential supervision and  * Requiring banks and brokers to raise margin and
regulation of domestic financial markets and institutions.  collateral requirements.
Essential infrastructure must be developed if domestic  * Limiting financial institutions'  ability to provide the
debt instruments are to be opened to international  domestic credit needed to short the currency and their
portfolio investment. Developing countries should  ability to loan the securities needed to short equity and
implement well-synchronized settlement and depository  fixed-income markets.
arrangements.
The risks from short-term debt-which  could threaten
financial stability-are  best controlled through sound
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20433.  Please contact Agnes Yaptenco, room  MC3-446,  telephone  202-473-8526,  fax 202-522-1155,  email address
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' I am grateful  to Michael  Adler,  Clemente  Luis  Del Valle,  Frank  Fernandez,  and Robert  Kowit  for  useful
comments. Jose Ramon  Martinez  Resano  provided  me with  valuable  information  on the Spanish  debt
market.1. Introduction
Foreign investors can play an essential role in the development of a domestic debt
market.  Foreign investors can enlarge the investor base, and contribute to the process of
financial innovation in domestic market.  If foreign investors provide financial services as
well as capital flows, the import of financial services results in additional efficiency gains
through  increased  competition  and  the  spread  of  good  practices.  In  addition,  the
availability of foreign investors willing to lend can dampen business cycles by reducing
the need of households and firms to contract consumption and investment spending when
hit by negative shocks to domestic production and income.  At the global level, capital
flows created by foreign investors permit a more efficient allocation of world savings and
direct resources to their most productive uses. Global capital flows produce opportunities
for intertemporal trade, portfolio diversification, and risk sharing.
Despite these large potential benefits, there also exist risks associated with foreign
investors.  Recent crises suggest that foreign investors can make host economies more
susceptible to volatility.  Such concern may be all the more warranted if the economies
have  weak  fiscal  policies,  unsound  banking  systems,  and  highly  distorted  domestic
markets.  Under some circumstances, the presence of foreign investors can increase the
extent of herding and play a key role in crisis contagion.  Foreign investors can amplify
the  effects of policy  distortions.  The entry of foreign financial institutions  can erode
margins  already  narrowed  by  competition  stemming  from  domestic  financial
liberalization.  Foreign  investors  can  facilitate  gambling  for  redemption  in  domestic
markets by offering access to elastically supplied offshore funding.
In developing a domestic debt market, developing countries face the challenge of
reaping  the  potential  benefits  that  foreign  investors  can offer  while  minimizing  the
associated risks.  Since neither the benefits nor the risk of foreign investors will exist
without their  interest,  a  developing  country's  first  step should  be  to  create  a  general
environment that will have appeal to foreign investors.  Most developing countries have
yet to undertake the liberalization of capital account transactions.  In sequencing capital
account liberalization, there is a danger in removing most restrictions on capital account
transactions before major problems in the domestic financial system are addressed.  For
liberalizing foreign portfolio investment in domestic debt instruments, development of
essential infrastructure is necessary.
2. Conceptual frameworks
Countries that have received largest portfolio inflows have experienced the largest
increase in market capitalization. 2 There seems to be considerable scope for increasing
the share of emerging  securities market assets in the portfolios of OECD institutional
investors. 3 From both the demand and supply sides, there would thus appear to be a great
2 World Bank, 1997.
3 See Blommenstein, 1997.potential role for foreign investors in the development of developing country domestic
debt markets.
The 1990s have seen an explosive growth of cross-border flows of portfolio capital.
Developing countries have attracted an increasing share of portfolio capital.  The share,
however, is still far less than that to industrial countries, 4 and the flows are concentrated
among a small group of developing countries 5.
An increasing interest in emerging markets has corresponded with "push" factors,  a
drop  in  US  interest  rates  and  slowdown  in  US  industrial  production.  This  implies
temporary  and  unstable  capital  flows  to  emerging  markets.  "Pull"  factors  include
increasingly stabilized macroeconomic environments (at least before the Asian crisis) and
continuing  efforts  for  economic  liberalization  on  the  part  of  developing  countries.
Empirical  evidence  seems  to  point  to  the  importance  of  push  factors  in  explaining
portfolio capital flows to developing countries, but country-specific developments could
be at least as important for some regions and seem to be more important for bond flows
than equity flows.6
2.1. International investment by institutional investors
OECD institutional investors comprising pension funds, insurance companies, and
mutual funds, were the major force behind the cross-border portfolio flows in the 1990s.
Of these investors, pension  funds and insurance companies have traditionally been the
more important institutional  investors in  OECD capital markets. 7 Recently, however,
mutual  fund  assets have  grown at a  much  faster pace than  have the  assets  of  other
institutional investors in the United States and many other countries.  In fact, assets of US
mutual  funds  now  exceed  50  percent  of  GDP,  although  some  of  these  represent
investments by company pension funds. 8
Investment  in  emerging  markets by  institutional  investors  is  a  relatively  recent
phenomenon.  Only since the mid-1980s have closed end investment funds (including
country funds) begun to invest in emerging stock markets.  Pension fund investment in
emerging markets is an even more recent phenomenon.  Expansion of the OECD pension
sector has increasingly been the main source of continued flow of capital into emerging
markets; investment has been through mutual funds or directly on their own account. 9
4 Whereas gross inflows of portfolio investment to industrial countries during 1989-96 amount to $892.9
billion,  the same  figure for developing  countries  is $123.4  billion. (Eichengreen,  Mussa,  et al., 1998)
5 Chuhan,  Claessens,  and Mamingi,  1998.
6For  example,  see Chuhan,  Claessens  and Mamingi,  1998.
7 Their combined share in 1995 is estimated to be 63 percent of total assets held by institutional investors.
See Blommenstein,  1998.
8 Vittas, 1998.
9  Blommenstein,  1997.
22.1.1. International  diversification ofportfolio
Institutional investors can diversify their portfolios globally by investing in foreign
securities.  By diversifying with emerging market securities, many investors believe (or
believed before the Asian crisis) that they reduce portfolio risk and  increase return.'0
There is a gradual but clear trend toward internationally diversified portfolios of pension
funds.  Portfolios of life insurance companies are less diversified than those of pension
funds.  Mutual  funds  in  larger  OECD  countries  have  significantly  more  diversified
portfolios than those of insurance companies and pension funds.'I
Institutional  investors  as  a  group  are much  less  internationally  diversified  than
would  be  true  for a  world market  portfolio.  Reasons  for this  home  bias  have been
identified  in  the  literature12 and include,  for  emerging  countries,  exchange  rate  risk,
transfer risk, settlement risk, and liquidity risk.  The use of hedging instruments such as
forwards, futures and options can reduce exchange rate risk,'3 but these instruments are
not always  available for emerging market currencies.  Furthermore, the price of these
instruments  will  offset  part of  the  gain  from  foreign investment,  they  may  only  be
available  for  short  periods,  and  trust  deeds  for  pension  funds  may  limit  their  use.
Transfer risk may affect the ability to repatriate returns; examples are exchange controls
and nationalization of foreign assets.  Settlement risk in less-developed securities markets
may be large, with a high proportion of delayed or failing transactions.  Liquidity risk
may be significant in narrow overseas markets.
Other impediments to international diversification include the nature of institutional
investor  liabilities.  Many  pension  schemes  and  life  insurance  contracts  have  very
precisely  defined nominal  liabilities.  In these cases, the preferred investment strategy
may be to  match domestic  liabilities with  domestic assets.  Regulatory  constraints on
foreign investments, the "benchmark"  orientation of fund managers,  and treatment by
institutional investors of emerging market securities as a separate asset class" 4 constitute
yet  other reasons.  Broadly based  mutual  funds  (in contrast  to  dedicated  developing
country mutual funds) are limited in the proportion of fund assets that can be invested in
developing  country  securities  by  the portfolio  allocation  guidelines  outlined  in  their
prospectuses.
2.1.2. Characteristics of institutional investors
Institutional investors have different investment objectives and fiduciary mandates,
operate under different regulatory and tax regimes, and have different tolerances to risk.
The  international  investment  behavior  of  pension  funds,  insurance  companies  and
investment  funds differs  largely  because  of the  different structure  of  their  liabilities.
10  For example, see Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, 1996 for this line of argument with respect to international
fixed income portfolios.
11  Blommenstein, 1997.
12 See Blomnmenstein,  1998.
13 See  BIS, 1986.
14 See IMF, 1995a for statistical evidence on the hypothesis of investors' treating developing country
equities as a separate asset class.
3There is  also a  dynamic two-way process  in which  the expansion of the  institutional
sector is fostering financial integration at the same time financial integration is having a
profound impact on the investment behavior of the institutional sector.
2.1.2.1. Pension funds
Quantitative  regulation of portfolio holdings  are in place  in  a number of  OECD
countries.  Regulations  are  intended  to  protect  pension  fund  beneficiaries  or  benefit
insurers and, in some countries, to steady demand for government securities.  Limits are
often imposed on holdings with relatively volatile returns, such as equities, real estate and
foreign assets, even though the average return on these assets might be higher than that
on  assets  with  so-called  stable  returns  (e.g.  government  bond  with  a  fixed coupon).
There are often also limits on self investment.
Other OECD countries  do not  impose quantitative limits,  but  impose guidelines
such  as  the  so-called  "prudent  man  rule".  "Prudence"  is  a  design  standard,  not  a
performance standard.  This is reflected in the two most significant elements of the rule,
the  requirement  to  diversify  and  the  exhortation to  favor  "seasoned"  situations  that
similarly placed institutions find appropriate.  In the United States, the application of this
design standard to  investment decisions has led to the overwhelming preponderance of
pension equity money being invested in a limited number of listed securities of American
corporations with large capitalization.  It may also account for the increase in the "index
mode" of investments.
Prudential  concerns are often the rationale for regulatory constraints on portfolio
holdings  of foreign securities.  The basic contrast is between countries that  follow the
"prudent  man  rule",  thus  enjoining  diversification,  and  those  that  impose  direct
restrictions  on  foreign  investment  for  prudential  reasons.  For  the  latter  countries,
prudential concerns may refer to asymmetric information (i.e., information deficiencies
about local business and financial conditions), regulatory standards for issuing securities,
as well as the various risks to  foreign investment. 15 Even pension  funds operating  in
countries that  have adopted  a "prudent  man rule"  have also  exhibited a  strong  home
bias.'6 In fact, pension funds in developed countries have shown a clear "home bias" in
their investment allocations and have usually stayed well within officially imposed limits.
Unlike banks, pension funds benefit from regular inflows of funds on a contractual
basis and from long term liabilities (i.e. with no premature withdrawal of funds), which
together  imply  little  liquidity  risk.'7 Given  such  liabilities,  pension  funds  may
concentrate portfolios on long term assets yielding the highest returns, compensating for
the  increased  risk by  pooling  across assets  whose returns  are  imperfectly  correlated.
Pooling is facilitated by the size of funds.18
5 See Davis, 1995.
16 See IMF, 1995b, and Reisen, 1997.
" Davis, 1995.
18 Davis, 1995.
4Members  of  pension  funds  are willing  to  accept low  liquidity  in  return  for  a
potential of higher returns from contractual annuities supported by tax deferral and for
the implicit insurance of pension levels by the sponsor (in defined-benefit schemes).  In
contrast,  life  insurance policies  entail a higher degree  of  liquidity through  premature
withdrawals and policy loans.  As a result, pension funds tend to have much more liberal
portfolio regulations than life insurance companies.19
2.1.2.2.  Insurance  companies
Each  OECD  country has  regulations  governing the  types  of  securities  that  are
eligible  for  insurance  company  investment  and  the  valuation  of  these  securities  for
regulatory purposes.  All OECD countries, and in the United States the individual states,
have approved lists of investments that insurance companies are allowed to hold.  These
lists are to ensure that eligible investments possess acceptable levels of investmnent  risk.
Most OECD countries impose maximum limits on classes  of investment: quoted
and unquoted domestic shares, foreign securities, real estate, mortgage loans and other
loans.  The limits' intent is to restrict the default and liquidity risks of investments and to
ensure sufficient portfolio diversification.  Although regulatory investment maxima vary
widely across OECD countries, the actual investment portfolios of insurance companies
do not appear very much constrained by them.  The limits have apparently often been
higher than what most insurance companies would themselves view as prudent levels. 20
Another important area of investment regulation concerns the matching by maturity
and currency of assets and liabilities.  Although only a very small number of countries
have statutory requirements for maturity or duration matching, in most OECD countries
regulatory  authorities review informally the time profiles of assets and liabilities when
they assess  the solvency  of insurance companies.  A serious mismatch  of  assets and
liabilities would endanger the solvency of life insurance companies, which tend to have
long-term liabilities often with implicit interest guarantees. To minimize interest rate risk,
life insurance companies should maintain the duration of their investments broadly in line
with the duration of their mainly long-term liabilities.  Life insurance companies with too
high a proportion of short-term assets would incur reinvestment risk in market situations
where interest rates are lower than warranted by the (often implicit) interest guarantees
on  their  liabilities.  Similarly,  in  nearly  all  OECD  countries  there  are  statutory
requirements for some degree of currency matching.
In  all  OECD  countries,  insurance  companies  are  free  to  use  derivatives  in
connection with the investment of their capital funds, but in almost all OECD countries
the use of derivatives is restricted to risk management.
In most OECD countries, the same maximum investment class percentages apply to
non-life and life companies.  Since investment risks in the two sectors differ, this degree
of uniformity is surprising.  Practical problems regarding the enforceability of these rules
seem to be the main reason why there are no bigger differences.
19  Davis, 1995.
20 Blommenstein, 1997.
5For non-life companies, maturity matching is relatively unimportant, because  the
duration of technical provisions is shorter than that of life companies and there  are no
interest guarantees.  On the other hand, currency matching is of greater importance for
non-life  companies,  since there is considerable uncertainty  about the timing  of  claim
payments.
2.1.2.3. Mutualfunds
Heavy  regulation by  governmental authorities is a  characteristic of  mutual  fund
activities in many OECD countries.  Regulations usually cover the following key areas:
self  dealings  and  affiliated  party  transactions; management  fees  of professional  fund
managers; capital structures; investment objectives and policies; protection of physical
integrity  of  the  asset  pool;  fair valuation  of  investor purchase  and  redemption;  and
disclosure  of  reliable  information  to  investors.  Restrictions  on  the  distribution  of
investment fund products (including restrictions on cross-border sales  of products  and
services) are usually motivated by investor protection concerns.  In the United States the
sale  of investment  fund  products  has traditionally  been subject  to  tight  and  detailed
regulations.
The types  of securities purchased by investment funds depend on the company's
investment  strategy.  Direct regulation  of portfolio  holdings  of  investment  funds  are
largely in the form  of constraints on  outward portfolio investments  and usually  place
limits on illiquid securities or require asset diversification.
2.2. Benefits  in attracting  foreign  investors
At  the  global  level,  capital  flows  created  by  foreign  investors  permit  a  more
efficient allocation of world savings and direct resources to their most productive uses.
Global  capital  flows  produce  opportunities  for  intertemporal  trade,  portfolio
diversification, and risk sharing.
For a country suffering a temporary recession or natural disaster, foreign investor
lending can smooth the consumption of households and firms.21 Foreign investor lending
can thus dampen business cycles. 22
Foreign investor lending allows developing countries with limited capital to finance
investment so that economic growth is promoted without sharp increases in saving rates.
As the following identity shows, the financing of domestic investment and government
budget deficit is not constrained by domestic private saving when foreign investors  are
present.
21 See Backus,  Kehoe,  and Kydland,  1992  and Obstfeld,  1994  for whether  restrictions  on capital  mobility
limit  a country's  ability  to smooth  consumption  when  hit by shocks  to income. Official  restrictions  on
capital  mobility  can help explain  the lack of international  risk  sharing. For example,  Lewis, 1996  and 1997
confirms  that co-movements  in consumption  and output  are stronger  in countries  with tighter  restrictions  on
capital flows.
22 See Greenwald,  Stiglitz,  and Weiss,  1984.
6SP+K=I+BD
Where:
SP  is private saving
K is net capital inflows
I is domestic investment
BD is budget deficit
The  increased  investor  base  when  foreign  investors  are  present  is  particularly
important  for  debt  market  development,  as  it  helps  deepen  liquidity  and  extend
maturities.  An important aspect of the investor base for government bonds in indiistrial
countries is that foreign holders of bonds increasingly dominate the market. 23 Through
sophisticated trading and investment strategies, foreign institutional investors can create
additional  liquidity  in  the form  of arbitrage  activities  and  diversification  of  investor
portfolios. 24 Foreign investors can contribute to maturity extension of government debt
when  the  government  debt  market  is  initially  centered around  short  maturities.  In
development of the Spanish debt market, foreign investment banks played a key role in
maturity extension of government debt.  In 1993, they held more than 50% of outstanding
balances of medium and long term bonds.
The import of foreign financial services results in additional efficiency gains.  Free
capital flows tend to cause specialization in the production of financial services, thereby
creating global efficiency gains.  For some countries, importing financial services will be
more  efficient  than producing  them. 25 Financial  services can be  imported  primarily
through domestic establishment and cross-border delivery.
The import of financial services can also bring dynamic efficiency to the domestic
financial sector.  It  can bring valuable examples and help spread  good practices.  The
increased  competition from abroad can make domestic producers  of financial services
26
more efficient, promoting innovation and enhancing productivity.
The process  of  financial  innovation has  been strongly  driven by  the  growth  of
institutional  investors  and  has  been  relatively  slow  in  markets  where  the  domestic
23 Broader  markets  induced  by a growing  presence  of foreign  investors  can help a government  reduce
borrowing  costs,  but, at the same  time, they can make it more  difficult  for a government  to implement
domestic  goals because  of an increasing  interdependence  among  financial  markets. See Dalla, 1997.
24 Institutional  investors  themselves  are very much interested  in  market  liquidity-the ability  to transact  in
large size without  moving  the price against  them and at low  transaction  costs. They demand  a market
infrastructure  characterized  by specialized  wholesale  markets,  which can process  large  transactions  very
rapidly and contribute  to liquidity.  (Blommenstein,  1997)
25 "The  fact that  the production  of many financial  services,  wholesale  financial  services  in particular,  is
characterized  by economies  of scale  and scope implies  that their  production  will be concentrated  in  certain
countries  on efficiency  grounds."  (Eichengreen,  Mussa,  et al., 1998,  p. 12)
26 When  the domestic  banking  system  is weak, opening  it to competition  from foreign  banks  (either  through
acquisition  of domestic  banks or startups  of new institutions)  is a delicate  matter. Placing  too much
pressure  suddenly  on a weak system  can incur  great  risk to the domestic  banking  sector. For example,
increased  international  competition  may cause decreases  in franchise  value,  giving domestic  banks  an
incentive  to assume  excessive  risks. See  below for more  details.
7institutional sector is less developed.  Foreign investors can speed the process.  Foreign
investors may introduce financial innovations, such as sophisticated trading arrangements
and  investment  techniques, which  may be  quickly  adopted  and further  developed  by
domestic  financial institutions.  At an early stage of Spanish debt market development,
domestic  institutional  investors  were  a  rather  unimportant  group,  but  grew  with
development  of the debt market.  Foreign  investors have played  an important  role in
introducing financial innovations into the Spanish market.  The innovations were quickly
copied  and  extended  by  domestic banks  and  asset  managers.  One example  of  such
innovations is the introduction of guaranteed return mutual funds.
Locally incorporated foreign-owned insurers could bring  additional and  possibly
innovative marketing and product competition to the national market that can deepen and
broaden  the  domestic  financial  services  marketplace.  Foreign  insurers  often  are
particularly good at risk pricing, a vital aspect of the insurance business.  Foreign insurers
bring  additional  capacity  to  the  insurance  business,  which  helps  businesses  and
individuals to transform their property, liability, income and other risk exposures to suit
the liquidity, security and other risk profiles they desire.  As foreign-owned insurers are
often part of  much  larger  international groups, their risk  pooling  activities  might  be
particularly  helpful,  thus  offering  the  potential  for  greater  pricing  and  investment
stability.  By bringing innovative and more efficient means of gathering and evaluating
information, foreign insurers aid capital allocation. 27
2.3. Risks associated with foreign investors
Incomplete  information can make lenders Prone  to  engage  in  herding  behavior,
causing sudden market movements and volatility.  Since foreign investors may have an
information  disadvantage  as  compared  with  domestic  investors,  their  presence  can
increase the extent of herding. 29 Kim and Wei, 1999 provide evidence consistent with
models suggesting information disadvantages of foreign investors.
Some theoretical studies show that when international investors can choose  from
many risky foreign investments and face a fixed cost of information about each country,
well-diversified investors may have relatively little incentive to acquire information about
all the countries in which they invest. 30
27 Skipper,  1997.
28 Herding  behavior  is not necessarily  "irrational". The models  of rational  herding  are typically  built on
one of three effects:  (i) payoff  extemalities,  where  the payoffs  to an agent  adopting  an action  increase  in  the
number  of other  agents  adopting  the same  action;  (ii) principal-agent  models,  where  managers  prefer to
"hide in the herd" not to be easily  evaluated,  or to "ride the herd"  to prove their quality;  and (iii)  models  of
information  cascades,  where agents  infer  information  from the actions  of others  and optimally  act alike.
29  See Kim and Wei, 1999 for the Korean case.  Froot, O'Connell and Seasholes, 1999 provide evidence of
very strong trend following in international inflows. Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler, 1999 find Latin
America equity funds tend to use positive feedback strategies in both crisis and non-crisis periods.
However, Choe, Kho and Stulz, 1999 find that foreign investors as a group engaged in positive feedback
trading before the crisis in Korea, but during the crisis feedback trading mostly disappeared.
30  For example, see Calvo and Mendoza, 1997. In their model, international investors experience less
incentive to gather information when financial markets in many countries are being liberalized at the same
time.  In this kind of model, financial market liberalization and the presence of foreign investors increase
8Foreign investors can also play a key role in contagion of crises.  One possibility is
the "monsoonal effect"31 caused by shifts in capital flows.  A large volume of literature
tends to conclude that external "push" factors have in fact exerted an important influence
on overall capital flows to emerging markets.
Other  possible  mechanisms  through  which  foreign investors  can  contribute  to
contagion include demonstration effects.  Information revealed about one asset or country
can be used by investors (both domestic and foreign) to update information about other
similar assets or countries.  Assuming that asset prices depend on an idiosyncratic factor
and a common factor, King and Wadhwani, 1990 show that a shock to the idiosyncratic
factor in one market will in general prompt investors to adjust positions in other maikets,
because investors are uncertain about the type of shock that has occurred.  Calvo, 1999
argues  that  if  informed  investors  trade  for  reasons  other  than  just  information,
uninformed investors may mimic informed investors even though ex post it turns out that
no new information about fundamnentals  was actually revealed.  He suggests margin calls
as one of possible non-informational reasons. 32
Another possible explanation for contagion is treatment by institutional investors of
emerging market securities as a separate asset class.  The across-the-board liquidation of
developing country equity holdings in the wake of the Mexican devaluation suggests that
there was insufficient differentiation among developing country equity managers about
risks in individual markets.  A more direct link for contagion is provided by open-end
mutual funds satisfying redemption demand in the wake of a crisis in one  country by
selling assets of other countries in the region. 33
The presence of foreign investors can amplify the effects of policy distortions and
agency problems associated with domestic financial liberalization.  Domestic financial
liberalization, by intensifying competition and squeezing margins in the financial sector,
can bring risks to an economy.  Without adequate prudential supervision and regulation,
domestic financial liberalization can allow financial institutions to expand risky activities
beyond their capacity to manage them.  External financial liberalization can expose the
economy to additional risks. The entry of foreign financial institutions can erode margins
further, and foreign investors can facilitate gambling for redemption by offering access to
elastically supplied  offshore  funding.  If  a  culture of  implicit  guarantees  exists  (for
example, a situation in which both lenders and borrowers perceive an exchange rate peg
as a link in a chain of implicit guarantees), the high nominal interest rates characteristic
the extent  of herding  permanently.  On the other  hand,  Bacchetta  and van Wincoop,  1998  present a model
where  international  investors  possess  the least information  about  recently  liberalized  markets  and  they
overcome  this problem  as learning  takes  place. Their  model  differs  from Calvo  and Mendoza's  in that
incomplete  information  is a transitional  problem  confined  to recent  liberalization.
31  Masson, 1998.
32  Schnasi and Smith, 1999 show that portfolio diversification and leverage may be sufficient to explain
why investors would find it optimal to sell many higher-risk assets when a shock to one asset occurs,
regardless of whether the leverage is margined or not.
33 Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler, 2000 find that when faced by investor redemptions, mutual fund
managers tend to liquidate their most liquid positions.
9of emerging markets can induce foreign investors to pour substantial short-term capital
flows into the markets.
Countries  with  substantial  short-term  external  debts  are  vulnerable  to  a  self-
fulfilling crisis.  If foreign investors suddenly lose confidence in the creditworthiness of a
country, they may refuse to roll over its stock of short-term debt, and the country will be
forced to finance its debt service from its foreign currency reserves.  If the reserves prove
inadequate, a sharp reversal of capital flows follows. 34 Mexico in December  1994, with
extensive  short-term  dollar-denominated  government  debts  and  few  dollar  reserves,
found itself in a crisis when previous lenders simultaneously demanded repayment and no
new lenders of dollars could be found.
In the 1992 ERM crisis, the bond market turbulence of 1994, and the recent Asian
crisis,  it has been  suggested that  hedge funds precipitated major  movements  in  asset
prices.  The popular view  is that  hedge funds take large, highly  leveraged, positions
against unsustainable  currency pegs and other misaligned asset prices and can quickly
reverse these positions so that major market moves result.
Eichengreen, Mathieson, et al., 1998, however, suggest that hedge fund capital is
small relative to the resources at the command of other institutional investors. 35 News of
hedge  fund positions,  however,  may induce  other investors  to  follow.  Hedge  funds
would thus play  an important role in herd  behavior. 36 Nonetheless,  according  to  the
limited econometric evidence provided by Eichengreen, Mathieson, et al., 1998, there is
some  indication that hedge funds herd together, but no  indication that other investors
regularly follow the lead of hedge funds.  While some of the case-study evidence points
to the role of hedge funds as a leader (with the 1992 ERM crisis most frequently cited), it
is equally possible  to  cite episodes where hedge funds were  a follower of the market
rather than a leader.
Any line between hedge funds and other institutional investors becomes blurred, for
other institutional  investors engage in many of the same practices.  Although high  net
worth individuals continue to be a steady source of investors in hedge funds, pension and
mutual  funds, insurance  companies,  and  university  endowments are among  the  more
important investors in hedge funds.
34  "Thus, crises may contain a self-fulfilling element, just as bank runs do, which can generate multiple
equilibria in international asset markets, and render the timing of crises somewhat indeterminate.  What we
see in these cases is a sharp break from an essentially tranquil equilibrium to a crisis state, rather than a
gradual deterioration in domestic interest rates and other market-based indicators." (Obstfeld, 1998, p. 24)
35  One conservative estimate of hedge fund capital is $90 billion (excluding funds of funds), of which $30
billion belongs to macro funds that take large directional positions in currency markets.  These figures pale
beside those for other institutional investors. The assets of institutional investors in  mature markets exceed
$20 trillion.  Although hedge fund capital can be substantial relative to smaller emnerging  markets, macro
funds concentrate a substantial share of their resources in the particular emerging markets only under
exceptional cases. (Eichengreen, Mathieson, et al., 1998)
36 The notion that other investors regard hedge fund managers as relatively well informed and hence follow
their lead can be interpreted in terms of an information cascade effect.
103. Policy issues
Given the potential benefits that foreign investors can offer, policymakers should
try to involve foreign investors in their efforts to develop a domestic debt market while
taking necessary steps to minimize the associated risks.  Since neither the benefits nor the
risk of foreign investors will exist without their interest, a developing country's first step
should be to create a general environment that will have appeal to foreign investors.
The record of last 20 years  suggests liberalization of  capital accounts heightens
countries'  susceptibility  to  crises.  In  sequencing capital  account  liberalization,  the
greatest danger is removal of most  restrictions on capital account transactions  before
major problems in the domestic financial system are addressed.  Countries in which these
problems are severe, but that choose to suddenly and fully open the capital account, run
the  risk  of  incurring  a  crisis.  Problems  in  the  domestic  financial  system  include
inconsistent and  shaky macroeconomic management; inadequate accounting, auditing,
and  disclosure practices;  implicit  government  guarantees; and  inadequate  prudential
supervision and regulation of domestic financial institutions and markets.
Essential infrastructure in domestic debt markets must exist for these markets to be
opened internationally.  This infrastructure includes efficient settlement and depository
arrangements, an  adequate supporting legal  system,  and sound banking and  payment
systems.  If a central clearing agency is required, its risk control procedures should meet
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) guidelines. 37
Short-term foreign liabilities pose special problems for the maintenance of financial
stability.  A crisis is likely to ensue should foreign funds suddenly flow out of a country.
Outflows of foreign holdings in government debt and in debt of the financial sector can
be the most damaging.  The risks from short-term debt are best controlled through sound
financial management  and prudential regulation.  For example, the  sovereign should
control  its  own  borrowing;  the  financial  sector  should  be  soundly  supervised  and
regulated; and through  a strong  system of  corporate governance, the corporate sector
should recognize and manage risks properly.  Still, given the magnitude of threats  to
financial stability, there may be a case for additional policy measures specifically aimed
at curbing excessive reliance on short-term debt.  A number of  studies conclude that
measures adopted by countries like Chile, Colombia, and Israel to influence the level and
composition of portfolio capital inflows have not been without beneficial effect.
It may be argued that liberalization of trade in financial services is an integral part
of  full  capital  market  liberalization.  Financial  services  are  traded  internationally
primarily through  domestic  establishments, and  cross-border trade.  The  presence of
foreign firms in the domestic market, as with other kinds of foreign direct investment,
may lead to the transfer of useful technology and of business and organizational know-
how.  Unfettered  but  safe  and  effective  trade  in  financial  services  requires,  at  a
fundamental level, the international coordination of accounting standards, transparency
procedures, and regulatory approaches.  The WTO agreement was the first multilateral
effort to address this issue.
3  World Bank  (1997).
113.1. Creating a general environment that will have appeal to foreign investors
*  The economic and political environment should be relatively stable.  Economic and
political volatility creates pressures on newly reformed systems, thus undermining the
confidence of potential foreign participants in the systems.
*  Each country's  system of laws, enforcement, and litigation should be comprehensive,
rational, fair, generally consistent with international standards and practice, and well
documented.  Foreign investors should feel comfortable with their ability to function
under the system.
. Each  country's  program  of  taxation  should  be  reasonable,  fair,  balanced  in  its
treatment of different participants in the economic and financial system, and balanced
in  its  treatment  of  different  types  of  financial  institutions,  instruments,  and
investments.38
*  Each country's  system of regulation should be limited to that which is needed and
productive;  balanced in  its  treatment  of  different  types  of  financial  institutions,
instruments, and investments; and fair to various participants.
*  Each country's  economic, financial, legislative and regulatory systems should strive
for transparency.
3.2. Consistent and stable macroeconomic environment
*  A country with fixed exchange rate and free capital mobility that follows an overly
expansionary monetary policy will be vulnerable to a speculative attack. 39
*  Eichengreen, Rose, and  Wyplosz,  1996a studied the  behavior  of macroeconomic
variables in the period leading up to attacks in 22 countries from 1967 to  1992.  For
non-ERM countries they found evidence that inconsistent fundamentals (e.g., larger
than normal budget deficits, inflation, and credit expansion) preceded the attack.
*  The public debt must be kept within reasonable bounds, and its maturity and currency
structure must be  prudently managed.  Beyond the sovereign, excessive leverage,
38 In Spain,  although  double  taxation  agreements  had  provided  partial  exemption,  slow  and cumbersome
procedures for refunding taxes withheld at the source acted as a strong disincentive for foreign investors
before full exemption of withholding tax for non-residents in 1990. The exemption has contributed
significantly to the maturity of both the primary and secondary markets.  However, factors of first order
importance in explaining foreign investment flow to the Spanish debt market were a substantial spread
between Spain and Germany and a very strong political commitment to create a pan-European political
entity.  Many foreign investors considered the acquisition of high-yielding debt from Spain as a sure bet.
39  Inconsistent policies would eventually lead to a crisis even in the absence of international capital
mobility.  The crisis would be delayed, because agents would have to reduce their holdings of domestic
currency through current account transactions. (Auernheimer, 1987)
12especially in the financial system, but also in the business or household sectors, may
be a cause for concern. Foreign currency debt may be a particular problem.
The growing literature on predicting crisis and developing useful  crisis prediction
indices identifies a large (and still growing) set of conditions indicating vulnerability
to currency and banking crises.  These include rapid growth of domestic credit, rapid
growth  of domestic  consumption, widening of  the current  account  deficit, rising
domestic inflation, real exchange rate appreciation, asset price booms, increases in
overseas deposits placed with the banking system, rapid growth in the ratio of short-
term to total capital inflows,  inadequate international reserves, mismatched currency
and  maturity structures of public, financial, and corporate  debt, and  deteriorating
terms of trade.
3.3. Mitigation of asymmetric information problem
*  Some problems of asymmetric information, which weaken market discipline, can be
addressed reasonably directly through public policy.
*  Policies that  encourage adherence to world-class  standards for  accounting,
auditing, and information disclosure
- Policies that facilitate enforcement of sound rules of corporate governance
*  Policies that  protect  investors and lenders from  fraud and unfair  practices
(including  through  a  credible  judicial  system  and  efficient  bankruptcy
procedures)
3.4. No implicit government guarantees
X  It  is  important not  to  create a  culture of implicit  guarantees that  may encourage
excessive, unsustainable capital inflows, and may result in a significant loss of capital
for lenders if they fail to assess credit risk prudently.
*  The government, usually the central bank, needs to be prepared to act as a lender of
last resort to the financial system in the event of systemic crisis.
*  This backstopping  function, though essential, is  a source  of moral hazard.
Therefore, careful design of the lender-of-last-resort facility is very important
in order to limit the scope and incentives for financial market participants to
take on excessive risk.
3.5. Adequate prudential regulation
. Strong,  market-based  incentives  for  prudent  risk  management  by  business,  and
especially by financial institutions, are critical.
•  Financial institutions must be subject to proper prudential supervision and regulation
by  an  appropriate  government  agency.  Inadequate  prudential  supervision  and
13regulation  create  scope  for  corruption,  connected  lending,  and  gambling  for
redemption.
*  Are  stronger  prudential  measures  on  the  claims  of  foreign  investors  justified,
assuming that the claims are more volatile?
Empirical evidence is not clear.  Experiences of financial crises  in  several
emerging  markets  have  suggested  that  domestic  residents  contributed
importantly to the short-term capital outflows that occurred in the run-up to
the crises in question. (Frankel and Schmukler, 1996, 1997)
*  Fischer,  1998 and  Mussa,  1998 suggest that  prudential regulation  should address
threats not  only to the stability of the banking system but also to general financial
stability created by the assumption of large volumes of short-term debt, particularly
that  denominated  in  foreign  currency,  by  financial  institutions,  firms  and  the
sovereign.  This  could be  justification  for  extending the  standard  arguments  for
prudential  supervision  and  regulation  beyond  the  short-terrn  foreign  currency
exposure of the banking system to at least to the monitoring of other short-term flows,
and perhaps to tax-like measures to discourage excessive exposure for the economy
as a whole.  (Eichengreen, Mussa, et al., 1998, p. 26)
*  Can capital controls on capital inflows have a significant effect on the composition of
capital inflows?
*  The empirical evidence is mixed.  Studies that distinguish between short-term
and long-term suggest that controls are likely to become progressively  less
effective the longer they remain in place.  Still, a number of studies conclude
that  measures  adopted  by  countries  like  Chile,  Colombia,  and  Israel  to
influence the level and composition of portfolio capital inflows have not been
without effect.
*  On the other hand,  in  1990, Korea started a series of  reforms designed to
liberalize the capital account.  The sequencing of the reforms led to an early
liberalization of conmnercial credit and short-term flows, while it left in place
significant restrictions on foreign direct investments and portfolio investmnents
in domestic equities. 40
*  To  some extent, the Korean capital controls program  should have had  the
opposite effect of the Chilean program.  Data from BIS confirm this.  Chile's
short-term borrowing from banks in the BIS area represents 43 percent of total
borrowing, while the corresponding figure for Korea is 68 percent.4'
3.6. Proper market infrastructure
*  Market infrastructure includes the systems and institutions that facilitate the trade and
custody of securities.  The necessary functions comprise matching buyers and sellers,
40 See Park and Song, 1996,  and Johnston,  Darbar,  and Echeverria,  1997.
41 However,  we should  wait until we  could collect  more  pervasive  empirical  evidence  before  we reach any
strong  conclusions.
14determining price, exchanging securities for good funds, registering securities to the
new owners, and collecting dividends and other custody functions. 42
*  The Group of 30 (G-30) initiative in 1989 and the 1995 workshops organized by the
International Society of Securities Administrators (ISSA) were two major efforts in
the  area  of  best  practice  in  market  infrastructure.  The  summary  of  the  G-30
recommendations and suggested ISSA revisions are as follows: 43
*  Matching  The  matching system  should be  integrated with  clearance  and
settlement  (C&S)  system,  and  all  trades  by  direct  and  indirect  system
(institutional) participants should be matched at most by T+1 (one day after
trade).
*  Clearance and settlement  Settlement should be accomplished by a delivery
versus payment system of good quality with same-day funds;  there should be
real-time gross settlement or a netting system that meets stringent risk control
standards,  depending on the  characteristics of the market;  and  the rolling
settlement system should have final settlement occur by T+3.
*  Depository  There should be one independent central depository managed for
the benefit of the industry, broadly defined, and if more than one depository
exists, they should be interlinked; there should be an independent registry or
registries;  and immobilization and dematerialization should be  encouraged,
and the legal framework revised, if necessary, to perrnit this.
*  Mexico  is  a  good  example  of  adaptation  of  the  above  standards  to  local
circumstances.  In Mexico, whereas securities are settled on a gross basis, Banco de
Mexico functions as the central clearing agency for the money side of the market
transactions.44
3.7. Hedge funds
. Limited  measures to  strengthen  supervision, regulation, and  market  transparency
might  be  considered to  deal with  the concern that  hedge funds can  dominate or
manipulate markets.
*  It  would be possible  to  strengthen the larger trader and  position reporting
requirements.
*  It would be  possible to  limit the  ability of hedge funds and  other foreign
investors to take positions in domestic financial markets (i) by taxing short
term capital inflows (as practiced in countries like Chile), (ii) by requiring
banks and brokers to  raise margin and collateral requirements, and (iii) by
limiting  the ability of financial institutions to  provide the  domestic  credit
needed to short the currency and to loan securities needed to short equity and
fixed-income markets. 45
42 World  Bank, 1997.
43 See World Bank, 1997, Box 1.3.
44 See World Bank, 1997,  Box 6.5 for the more detailed description of the Mexican experience.
45The  imposition of position limits, margin requirements, and other permanent restrictions on trading may
slow the development of active and liquid bond markets. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the
154. Conclusions
To reap all of the potential benefits foreign investors can offer, a host country must
create an environment that will have appeal to foreign investors.  This includes a stable
economic and political environment; a comprehensive, rational, and fair legal system; a
reasonable, fair, and balanced tax program; a productive, balanced, and  fair regulatory
system; and transparency in economic, financial, legislative, and regulatory systems.  In
addition, the country should undertake capital account liberalization successfully.
To undertake capital account liberalization successfully, and also minimize  risks
associated  with  foreign  investors,  capital  account  liberalization  must  be  properly
sequenced.  The  most  important  point  to  recognize  in  sequencing  capital  account
liberalization is the danger of removing most restrictions on capital account transactions
before major problems in the domestic financial system are addressed.  The countries in
which these problems are  severe, but that  choose suddenly to  open  fully the capital
account,  run  the  risk  of  incurring  a  crisis.  Possible problems  of  this  sort  are:  (i)
inconsistent and shaky macroeconomic management; (ii) severe asymmetric information
problems (e.g. inadequate accounting, auditing, and disclosure practices) in the financial
and corporate sectors; (iii) implicit government guarantees; and (iv) inadequate prudential
supervision and regulation of domestic financial institutions and markets.
With  respect  to  liberalizing  foreign  portfolio  investment  in  domestic  debt
instruments, development of essential infrastructure is necessary if these markets are to
be  opened internationally.  Developing countries should implement well-synchronized
settlement, and depository arrangements.
Recent experience  suggests that  short-term debt poses  special problems for  the
maintenance of financial stability.  The risks from short-term debt are best controlled
through  sound  financial  management  and  prudential  regulation.  Still,  given  the
magnitude of threats to financial  stability, there may be a  case for  additional policy
measures specifically aimed at curbing excessive reliance on short-term debt.  A number
of studies conclude that measures adopted by countries like Chile, Colombia, and Israel
to influence the level and composition of portfolio capital inflows have not been without
effect.
It may be argued that liberalization of trade in financial services is an integral part
of  full capital market  liberalization.  Financial services can be  traded  internationally
primarily through two different mechanisms: (i)domestic establishment, and (ii) cross-
border delivery.  The presence of foreign firms in the domestic market, as with other
kinds of foreign direct investment, may lead to the transfer of useful technology and of
business and organizational know-how.
measures adopted to discourage position taking by hedge funds and other investors do not encourage a
relapse into costly policies of financial repression.
16On  the  other hand,  the  concern that  hedge  funds can  dominate  or  manipulate
markets  can be  dealt  with  limited measures to  strengthen supervision, regulation  and
market transparency.  It would be possible to  strengthen the larger trader and position
reporting requirements.  Also, it would be possible to limit the ability of hedge funds and
other foreign investors to take positions in domestic financial markets (i) by taxing short
term capital inflows  (as practiced  in countries like  Chile), (ii) by  requiring banks  and
brokers to raise margin and collateral requirements, and (iii) by limiting the ability of
financial institutions to provide the domestic credit needed to  short the currency and to
loan the securities needed to short equity and fixed-income markets.
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